In this section (and throughout the paper), it will be convenient to think of society as divided into a number of groups; all the members of any one group have the same wealth but groups differ in their per capita wealth holdings.
We assume that labor is homogeneous (all workers receive the same wage). Thus, all the members of any one group have the same income as well as the same wealth. Each factor is paid its marginal product. We assume a concave, constant returns to scale production function ;3 if y is output per man and k is the aggregate capital-labor ratio, then Reproduction occurs at a constant rate n, there is no intermarriage between income groups, and wealth is divided equally among one's offspring. These assumptions ensure that the proportion of the population in each group, ai, remains constant.
We can now write down the basic equation of per capita wealth accumulation for group i: Observe that the aggregate capital accumulation behavior is independent of the distribution of wealth. This is an essential result of the linearity assumption. In analyzing this model, we shall first discuss the aggregate balanced growth paths and their stability. We shall then discuss the conditions under which a given group is in equilibrium, i.e., has unchanging per capita wealth. Next, we will consider short and long run movements in the wealth distribution. Finally, we will investigate what these results imply for movements in the distribution of income.
Aggregate Balanced Growth Paths
If the economy is in balanced growth, k = 0, i.e., (2.9) my = nk -b.
In the case of b = 0, a strictly proportional savings function, this is simply the "Solow" equilibrium. If b > 0, there is a unique value for which my = nk, i.e., a unique aggregate balanced growth path. If, on the other hand, b < 0 (at a zero income a negative amount is saved), then there will in general exist two balanced growth paths. 5 If there is only one balanced growth path, it is globally stable, since for capitallabor ratios greater than that of the balanced growth path, savings per capita is less than that required to maintain the same capital-output ratio with population growing at the rate n. The converse follows for capital-labor ratios less than that of the balanced growth path.
On the other hand, if there are two balanced growth paths (Figure 1 ), the lower one will be locally unstable and the upper will be locally stable. Differentiating the capital accumulation equation (2.8) with respect to k and evaluating it at k = 0, we obtain (2.10)
.k = mr -n.
The balanced growth path is stable or unstable as ak/ak is less than or greater than zero. The slope of the my curve is mr, and n is the slope of the nk -b curve. Since my is concave, it is clear that the lower intersection must have mr > n and the upper intersection must have mr < n.' Thus, to the left of the lower equilibrium, savings per man is less than that required to sustain that capital-labor ratio, and hence the capital-labor ratio falls (continually).7 Above the lower equilibrium, but below the upper equilibrium 5 These results are contingent on the concavity of the production function and on the production function satisfying the Inada conditions. 6 In the singular case of a tangency between the my curve and the nk -b curve, where the upper and lower equilibria merge together, we have a stable-unstable equilibrium: stable with respect to upward deviations, unstable with respect to downward deviations. In this equilibrium, rnr = n, the rate of profit is equal to the rate of growth divided by the marginal propensity to save. 7 What happens when k = 0 is a question which we shall postpone for the moment. Negative k is possible only if there exist foreign countries from whom one can borrow. For a long run savings function it may well be argued on the basis of econometric evidence that b is zero; we prefer, however, to keep the analysis as general as possible. (between k* and k** on Figure 1 ) the reverse situation holds, so that the economy has an expanding capital-labor ratio. Finally, above the upper equilibrium (k**), the economy has a declining capital-labor ratio.
Equilibrium for Wealth-Income Groups
Having analyzed the aggregate properties of the model, we turn now to investigate the behavior of the separate wealth-income groups.
It should be clear that for any given aggregate capital-labor ratio k, there can exist at most only one group, with per capita wealth c*, which is in equilibrium, i.e., only one group whose per capita wealth is neither increasing nor decreasing. We require eici = 0 or 
Movements in Distribution of Wealth
We examine now how the distribution of wealth changes over time. Without loss of generality, we consider the case of two income groups. We wish to know whether c1 is growing faster or slower than c2, given that c1 < c2. If it is growing faster, then the ownership of wealth (at least in a relative sense) is becoming more "equalitarian;" if it is growing slower, it is becoming less "equalitarian." But Since the condition for stability for aggregate equilibrium is n -mr > 0, we have the general proposition that, f the economy is at a stable equilibrium, the distribution of wealth must eventually be equalitarian.8 But at the lower equilibrium, those groups with initial per capita wealth less than the equilibrium will grow continually poorer, while those groups with initial per capita wealth greater than the equilibrium will grow continually richer. This follows from ei = mw + b + mrk* + m(ci -k*)r -nk* -n(ci -k*) = (ci -k*)(mr -n) Z 0 as ci k*.
(And of course, those with more initial per capita wealth have a faster rate of growth of per capita wealth.)9 Thus it should be clear that although the fact that each of the individual groups is in equilibrium implies that the aggregate is in equilibrium, the converse is not true. The aggregate can be in equilibrium while the distribution of wealth is changing.
We are finally ready to fully describe movements of the distribution of wealth in our economy.
(i) There exist in general two balanced growth paths,'0 along which the capitallabor ratio, output-capital ratio, wage rate, etc., are all constant.
(ii) The one corresponding to the higher capital-labor ratio is stable both with respect to the aggregate (locally) and with respect to the component income classes (globally). If the overall capital-labor ratio is increased or decreased (provided it does not fall below k*), the economy returns to the balanced growth path, and if individual income classes are perturbed, the economy eventually returns to the equalitarian state.
(iii) The one corresponding to the lower capital-labor ratio is unstable, both with respect to the aggregate and with respect to the component income classes. If the aggregate k is decreased, it continues to decrease (forever); if it is increased, it continues to increase until it arrives at the upper equilibrium. If individual income classes are perturbed from the equal distribution position in such a way that the aggregate capital-labor ratio remains constant, the classes with per capita wealth greater than the overall capital-labor ratio continually increase their per capita wealth. The converse is true for those with less wealth than the "average."
(iv) If the economy is initially within the region between k* and k, then the overall capital-labor ratio is increasing and the economy eventually arrives in a state with completely equal distribution of income and wealth; but until the overall capital-labor ratio becomes equal to k, the relative distribution of wealth becomes more uneven." 1 (v) For all capital-labor ratios greater than k, the distribution of wealth becomes (relatively) more even, eventually reaching complete equality.
Movements in the Distribution of Income
The adaptation of these results to movements in the distribution of income is straightforward. If the elasticity of substitution of the production function12 is equal to one, then the analysis carries over exactly. If the elasticity of substitution is less than one, for instance, then (a) in the region k < k < k**, the decreasing share of capital and the equalization of its ownership both serve to equalize the distribution of income; (b) in the region k > k** the increasing share of capital and the equalization of its ownership offset each other; eventually, of course, the equalization tendencies dominate; (c) in the region k* < k < k, the decreasing share of capital and the increasing spread in the ownership of capital offset each other; eventually, the economy moves into the region k < k < k**; (d) in the region k < k*, the increasing share of capital and the increasing spread in its ownership both serve to make the distribution of income more unequal.
The case of elasticity of substitution greater than unity may be analyzed similarly. 3 " Perhaps one should not draw morals about the real world from such simple models. If the distribution of wealth appears in the short run to be becoming more uneven, do not lose hope in the capitalist system. Eventually (which may be a long time), the economy may lead to an equalitarian state, by its own accord. 12 It should be noted that none of the results thus far has depended on the shape (except that f is concave and satisfies the Inada conditions) of the production function. 13 The two one-class equilibria have exactly the same stability properties as in the linear case, and nothing more need be said about it here. The two-class equilibrium has, as one might expect, properties of both the lower and upper equilibrium one-class economies; if part or the entire lower class is disturbed, so that their wealth per capita is less than that in equilibrium, they become increasingly poorer and if they become slightly richer (in per capita wealth terms) than in equilibrium, they become increasingly richer, until they "merge" with the upper class. Of course, we have been assuming throughout this process that as individuals shift their class membership the aggregate capital-labor ratio changes in the appropriate way. As a larger proportion of the population join the upper 14 The one class cases require ci = k. Hence we require s(w + rk) = nk. But since s(k) is a concave function of k, and nk is a linear function of k, there can be at most two solutions.
In class, the aggregate capital-labor ratio must rise. But as it rises, it leads all the other members of the lower class out of equilibrium, and since the lower equilibrium is unstable, there is no mechanism for them to reach equilibrium. It is unlikely then that any two-class equilibrium situation could ever be maintained for long.
Hence, in this model as in the linear model first examined, if the balanced growth path is stable, there is a tendency in the long run for the equalization of wealth and income-with the possible exception of a group (in an underdeveloped economy perhaps almost the entire economy) whose wealth is at some lower bound (zero, or the upper bound on indebtedness). 
Savings as a Function of Wealth and

Ci The analysis proceeds exactly as in Section 2 of this paper, and (3.3) is identical to (2.5) with n replaced by n -z. If z is positive, then it is as if the rate of population growth is smaller than it actually is, so that the equilibrium capital-labor ratio is
higher, r is lower, w is higher, etc. The more reasonable assumption is to make z negative, indicating that the more wealth one has, for any given income, the less one saves (as for instance some of the life cycle stories suggest); then it is as if n is higher, i.e., the equilibrium capital-labor ratio will be lower, wages will be lower, and the profit rate will be higher.
An alternative formulation of savings behavior is the following: individuals have a desired wealth-income ratio, given by q*. If the wealth-income ratio is less than the desired, they accumulate. If it is greater than the desired, they decumulate. We may write the adjustment process as where sw is the savings propensity out of wages. In the singular case where sw = 0, there is no tendency for equalization. Indeed, in balanced growth, since the aggregate capital-labor ratio is fixed, increases in wealth by one group must come at the expense of others.
Variable Rates of Reproduction
In this subsection, we assume that the rate of reproduction of the ith group is a function of its per capita income ni = n(yi). For simplicity, we shall revert to the linear savings assumption. It is clear that different groups will in general have different rates of reproduction and the group with the highest rate of reproduction "dominates" the entire population. All groups except the dominant one asymptotically "disappear." Assume there are only two groups-the rich and the poor. If the rich reproduce more quickly than the poor, then although it is true that "the poor have ye always among you," in a relative sense they disappear. On the other hand, even if the rich reproduce more slowly than the poor, so that they become an infinitesimal part of the population, they may still have more than an infinitesimal part of the wealth of the total economy. To see this, if Kr Again, we observe that for "high" k, the poor increase their per capita wealth relative to the rich, until incomes and wealth are completely equalized, while for "low" k the rich grow richer relative to the poor. But note the two effects of the income tax: First, the critical k which determines whether there is wealth equalization or not is lower, since now the condition is not b + mw = 0, but b + mw + mrtk = 0. In fact, at a tax rate greater than 1 -(n/mr), even at the lower balanced growth path equalization of wealth will occur. Second, the rate at which equalization occurs is increased (or, if the distribution becomes more uneven, it does so at a slower rate than in the absence of the tax).
Similarly, the effects of progressive income taxes, profits taxes, and wealth taxes may be analyzed. It can be shown that for taxes of the same revenue the redistributive effects of either a profits tax or a progressive income tax are greater than those of the proportional income tax.
THE SPEED OF EQUALIZATION: AN EXAMPLE
In this section we shall work through an example to give the rough orders of magnitudes of the time involved. We take the Cobb-Douglas production function, .04k*, it takes 46.4 years for V(k) to be reduced in half (i.e., for k = .8586k*) .
We have already noted that the speed of equalization is very sensitive to n and a. If, for instance, the rate of growth increases from one per cent to two per cent, the "half-life" is reduced from 46.2 to 23.1 years. PART 
II
In the first part of this paper, we have identified some strong long term forces leading the economy to equalization of wealth and income. There are, on the other hand, several forces tending to preserve inequality in wealth and income. The forces that we shall focus on in particular are (a) heterogeneity of the labor force, (b) "class" type savings behavior, and (c) alternative inheritance policies.
HETEROGENEOUS LABOR FORCE
In this section we assume that some labor is more productive than other labor and receives accordingly a higher wage. We further assume that different kinds of labor are related to each other in a "pure labor augmenting way" so the ratio of the wage of any two groups is constant, and there is no intermarriage between groups. We revert to the assumption of a constant rate of growth of population and a linear savings function.
If 
CLASS SAVINGS BEHAVIOR
The presence of different classes in the economy with different savings behavior may also give rise to disparities in the distribution of wealth. Consider a two-class economy: a capitalist class which does not work and saves sj of its profits, and a workers class which derives its income from wages plus return on the capital previously saved and saves si of its income (regardless of the source). Models with this savings behavior have been investigated by Pasinetti [7] , Meade [6] , Samuelson and Modigliani [8] , and Stiglitz [9] . Because of the linear savings assumption, the aggregate capital accumulation behavior is independent of the distribution of wealth. Thus, there is at most one two-class balanced growth path, (i.e., a balanced growth path with both capitalists and workers present). Along this balanced growth path, r = n/si. It is easy to see that distribution of wealth among the capitalists is an historic accident, and, as in the Kaldorian case with savings out of wages equal to zero, increases in the capital of one capitalist occur at the expense of other capitalists. All "workers," on the other hand, have the same wealth and income asymptotically, since for any group,15 (7.1) e = siw + sirkw + sir(c -kw) -nkw -n(c -kw)
where kw is the capital per man owned by workers. Since si < sj, sir -n < 0, so that if any labor group has per capita wealth greater than the average, kw, its per capita wealth declines. The converse holds for any labor group with less per capita wealth than the average. There also exists a unique balanced growth path with only workers present (the "dual regime" of [8] ). But this case is identical to that investigated above in Section 2 with b = 0, for which we have already shown that asymptotically all wealth is evenly distributed.
PRIMOGENITURE
So far in this paper we have considered only cases where wealth was divided equally among one's children. Without going into a detailed exposition of alternative inheritance programs, let us consider the case perhaps most contrary to that which has been discussed thus far, that of primogeniture (all wealth being left to the first born son). To carry through the analysis we shall need to introduce some further simplifications, and shift the analysis to discrete time.
We consider a period in which the population doubles itself. Each "family" has exactly two sons and two daughters. For simplicity, we shall say that children are born at the end of the period. Everybody lives for only one period, parents dying after giving birth to their quadruplets. We shall examine only equilibrium paths. Then, at the beginning of any period one half of the population has zero capital. Of the remainder, one half are born to fathers who were first born, one half to fathers who were not. Yale University
